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THE DUTY TO DEFEND IN LIABILITY INSURANCE
POLICIES: HAS IT GONE TOO FAR?
I. INTRODUCTION
Far from being the grand celebration planned, the Boston Sym-
phony Orchestra's 100th birthday turned into a legal nightmare. In
1982, the Boston Symphony Orchestra ("BSO") cancelled a contract
with Vanessa Redgrave due to "circumstances beyond [the Orchestra's]
reasonable control."' BSO took this action after it had received protests
over the hiring of Ms. Redgrave due to her political views and support of
the Palestine Liberation Organization.2 Although other employers of
Ms. Redgrave had been pressured to fire her because of her political
views,3 this was the first time that an employer had acquiesced to these
demands.4
Although BSO would likely have paid Ms. Redgrave her contract
fee, this was not satisfactory to Ms. Redgrave.5 Instead, she brought suit
for breach of contract and violation of her civil rights under the Massa-
chusetts Civil Rights Act.6 As a result of her suit, Ms. Redgrave re-
ceived $27,500 for wrongful breach of contract 7 and consequential
damages of $12,000.8
Subsequently, BSO sued its liability insurer, Commercial Union In-
surance Company ("Commercial Union") 9 for failing to defend BSO in
1. Heins, Vanessa Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra: Federalism, Forced Speech,
and the Emergence of the Redgrave Defense, 30 B. C. L. REV. 1283, 1294 (1989).
2. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1988).
3. Heins, supra note 1, at 1295.
4. Id. at note 54.
5. Id. at 1295.
6. 855 F.2d at 890. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, §§ IlH-I (1986).
7. 855 F.2d at 891.
8. Id. at 900. Producer Theodore Mann testified that he decided not to hire Ms.
Redgrave for an upcoming performance of Heartbreak House after hearing of Ms. Redgrave's
discharge by BSO. Heins, The Clearing of Vanessa Redgrave, 245 THE NATION 713 (1987).
As a result of this testimony, Ms. Redgrave was awarded $12,000 in consequential damages.
This amount represents the loss of one identifiable job opportunity for which Ms. Redgrave
was able to submit sufficient evidence to prove that the cancellation of "Oedipus Rex" had
caused. Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial
Union Ins., Co. (Super. Ct. Mass. July 7, 1988) (No. 5038).
9. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., 545 N.E.2d 1156
(Mass. 1989). Although the insurance policy issued to BSO was by American Employers In-
surance Company, the superior court entered an order that the judgment would also apply to
Commercial Union Insurance Company, which is the parent company of American Employers
Insurance Company. Application for Direct Appellate Review at 1, note 1, Boston Symphony
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this action.' 0 The Superior Court of Massachusetts found that Commer-
cial Union did have a duty to defend BSO and, therefore, must pay the
BSO's legal expenses for as much as one million dollars. " This note will
examine the consequences of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's holding in Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial
Union Ins., Co. 2 that an insurance company, which has not provided
coverage for actions of breach of contract, must nevertheless defend an
action claiming breach of contract with resulting consequential damages
that are only potentially within the scope of coverage provided by the
insurance policy. '
3
Employers do cancel performances of well-known actors and ac-
tresses.' 4 The superior court judge, who held that there was a duty to
defend, noted that "[c]ontracts are frequently broken, and even willful
breach is not unusual."' 5 The policy language at issue in this case is used
by many insurance companies across the United States.'6 Since breach
of contract is a typical cause of action, the interpretation given to the
language in this type of personal injury insurance policy is of great signif-
icance both to the entertainment industry, which employs well-known
personalities, and to insurance companies, which may be called upon to
defend these actions.
II. THE UNDERLYING CASE
As part of the festivities to celebrate the BSO's 100th birthday, BSO
had planned a series of concerts for Carnegie Hall in New York City and
Orchestra, Inc. v. American Employers Ins., Co., and Commercial Union Ins., Co. (Super. Ct.
Mass. July 7, 1988) (No. 89-P-37). Neither the superior nor the supreme court gave any expla-
nation as to why Commercial Union should be held liable for the insurance contract that was
issued by American Employers. This note will only refer to Commercial Union. Appellants
Petition for Rehearing at 1, note 1, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins., Co., 545 N.E.2d 1156 (Mass. 1989).
10. BSO alleged three claims: breach of contract, unfair claims settlement practices in
violation of G.L. c. 93A, and unfair claims settlement practices in violation of G.L. c. 176D,
§ 3(9). Brief for Appellants at 2, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., v. Commercial Union
Ins., Co. (Super. Ct. Mass. July 7, 1988) (No. 5038).
11. The National Law Journal, November 20, 1989, at 6, col. 2.
12. 545 N.E.2d 1156 (Mass. 1989).
13. Application for Direct Appellate Review at 20, Boston Symphony Orchestra Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins., Co. (Super. Ct. Mass. July 7, 1988) (No. 89-P-37) [hereinafter Appli-
cation for Direct Appellate Review].
14. Brief for Appellants at 34, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union
Ins., Co. (Super. Ct. Mass. July 7, 1988) (No. 5038) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].
15. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 230, 236 (D. Mass. 1983).
16. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commer-
cial Union Ins., Co., 545 N.E.2d 1156 (Mass. 1989) [hereinafter Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing].
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Symphony Hall in Boston. 7 BSO entered into a contract with Vanessa
Redgrave Enterprises, Limited ("Redgrave Enterprises") on March 22,
1982, to have Ms. Redgrave narrate six performances of Igor Stravin-
sky's "Oedipus Rex" beginning in April 1982.18 BSO publicly an-
nounced its choice of Ms. Redgrave on March 25, 1982, and on March
26 the Boston Globe reported that the hiring of Ms. Redgrave was a "the-
atrical coup" for BSO. 19
BSO immediately began receiving angry protest calls concerning the
hiring of Ms. Redgrave.2° According to Ms. Redgrave, these threats
were made because of her "public statements on public issues involving
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization."'" On March 29, BSO
learned that a local Anti-Defamation League would be meeting to dis-
cuss the possibility of censuring BSO.22 That same day Irving W. Rabb,
a BSO trustee and an influential figure in Jewish philanthropic affairs,
called Thomas W. Morris, the General Manager of BSO, to express his
concerns over the hiring of Ms. Redgrave.23
At a meeting with the Boston Police Commissioner, Joseph Jordan,
on March 30, Morris was warned that if the Jewish Defense League were
to become involved, the Boston police would be unable to prevent an
interruption of the performance.24 On that same day, Morris gave in-
structions to remove Ms. Redgrave's name from a scheduled advertise-
ment that was due to appear in the Sunday edition of the New York
Times.25 BSO explained its dilemma to Ms. Redgrave who refused to
withdraw from the performance.26 With only two weeks until rehearsals
were to begin, Morris felt his only alternative was to cancel the perform-
17. Heins, supra note 1, at 1284.
18. Redgrave, 557 F. Supp. at 233.
19. Heins, supra note 1, at 1288.
20. Id. According to trial testimony in 1984, the BSO received more than 100 telephone
calls and four letters opposing the hiring of Vanessa Redgrave due to her support of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization. Boston Globe, January 24, 1989, (Arts & Film), at 22.
21. 557 F. Supp. at 233. Opposition to Ms. Redgrave's political views began after she
produced and financed (by selling her house in Britain) a documentary film that supported the
Palestine Liberation Organization. During her 1978 acceptance speech for an Academy
Award as Best Supporting Actress for "Julia," as Jewish groups picketed outside and members
of the Jewish Defense League burned her in effigy, Ms. Redgrave praised the Academy voters
for having "stood firm and refus[ing] to be intimidated by a small band of Zionist hoodlums
who have insulted Jews all over the world in their struggle against fascism and Nazism."
Henry, Vanessa Ascending, TIME, October 9, 1989, at 109 and Heins, supra note 8, at 713.
22. Heins, supra note 1, at 1289.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1291.
25. Id. at 1292.
26. Heins, supra note 1, at 1293.
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
ance of "Oedipus Rex." '27 BSO cancelled its contract with Redgrave En-
terprises28 and on April 1, 1982, BSO issued a press release which
"announced the cancellation of the Stravinsky program, and substitution
of the Berlioz Requiem, because of 'circumstances beyond [the Orches-
tra's] reasonable control.' "29
III. FACTS GIVING RISE TO BSO's CLAIMS AGAINST
COMMERCIAL UNION
Ms. Redgrave sent BSO a letter demanding that BSO apologize and
reinstate her contract.30 She threatened a lawsuit if these demands were
not met, to vindicate her rights, "including among others, her 'right' to
speak freely, her 'right' to perform without fear of blacklisting or dis-
crimination, and her 'right' not to be subjected to public ridicule or
embarrassment."3 1
BSO sent Ms. Redgrave's letter to its liability insurer, Commercial
Union, along with a letter stating BSO's expectations that Ms.
Redgrave's suit "would involve claims for damages to her personal and
business reputation."32 BSO also sent Commercial Union a copy of its
contract with Ms. Redgrave and all correspondence and relevant mate-
rial concerning the potential suit.3
On October 22, 1982, Ms. Redgrave and Redgrave Enterprises filed
suit against BSO claiming that BSO had breached its contract with Ms.
Redgrave and that "BSO's repudiation and breach of contract ha[d] led
27. Id. When attempts to persuade Ms. Redgrave to withdraw from the program failed,
Peter Sellars, who was staging and producing the event, accused the BSO of blacklisting and
refused to go forward without Ms. Redgrave. At this point the BSO cancelled the entire pro-
gram. Heins, supra note 8, at 713.
28. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
29. Heins, supra note 1, at 1294. Ms. Redgrave tried to invoke the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act of 1979 "to protect her against the actions of the public who were opposed to her
politics." Boston Globe, Jan. 24, 1989, (Arts & Film), at 22. In a post-trial decision, Judge
Robert Keeton overruled the consequential damages that the jury had awarded Ms. Redgrave
on the unprecedented theory that the BSO "could have caused the damages only be communi-
cating its opinion by implication... that Redgrave was too dangerous to employ." Keeton
reasoned that because the communication of opinions is protected by the First Amendment,
the BSO could not be held liable for the consequences of its cancellation. Heins, supra note 8,
at 713-14. On appeal, the First Circuit agreed with Judge Keeton, noting that BSO had also
been a victim of public opinion. According to the First Circuit, BSO had a right to cancel
public concerts if the artistic "integrity" of the performance would be compromised by protes-
ters that competed with Ms. Redgrave's right to political beliefs. Boston Globe, Jan. 24, 1989,
(Arts & Film), at 22.
30. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id
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others to refrain from hiring Ms. Redgrave for professional engage-
ments."34 Four days after BSO forwarded the complaint to Commercial
Union, Commercial Union disclaimed coverage and refused to defend
BSO.35
On two subsequent occasions, BSO provided Commercial Union
with information regarding the lawsuit.36 This information stated that
the damages that Ms. Redgrave would be seeking were uncertain. 3
Although Ms. Redgrave claimed consequential contract damages, the
damages sought during the litigation appeared to flow from implications
of BSO's act of cancelling "Oedipus Rex."' 38 Commercial Union still re-
fused to defend BSO.39
BSO brought suit against Commercial Union in Superior Court of
Massachusetts on two counts.40 The first count alleged that Commercial
Union "wrongfully failed to defend the BSO" in the action brought
against it by Ms. Redgrave. 41 The second count alleged that Commercial
Union "engaged in unfair claims settlement practices."42
34. 545 N.E.2d at 1157. See also Application for Direct Appellate Review, supra note 13,
at 9-10. The relevant portion of Ms. Redgrave's complaint is as follows:
10. On or about March 22, 1982, BSO entered into a contract with Enterprises ....
11. After the contract was entered into but before the scheduled dates of the per-
formances, the BSO repudiated and breached its contract with Enterprises....
13. BSO's repudiation and breach of contract has led others to refrain from hiring
Ms. Redgrave for professional engagements.
14. As a result of BSO's repudiation and breach of contract, plaintiffs have sustained
monetary damages, including, incidental and consequential loss ....
Id.
35. 545 N.E.2d at 1157. When suit was filed against BSO, Commercial Union consulted
with the law firm of Morrison, Mahoney & Miller seeking coverage advice. Commercial
Union was advised that the policy did not cover the claim asserted against BSO and Commer-
cial Union disclaimed coverage in a letter dated October 29, 1982. Application for Direct
Appellate Review, supra note 13, at 3-4.
36. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Commercial Union received a copy of the "Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant BSO's Motion to Dismiss" which was forwarded to Morrison, Mahoney & Miller.
A letter dated February 4, 1983, advised BSO that the additional submission still did not
indicate coverage. Commercial Union also requested any specific facts that BSO might have
on which Ms. Redgrave's claim could be covered under the policy. On September 7, 1984,
BSO forwarded documents to Commercial Union for their review and advice. BSO then filed
suit against Commercial Union on October 22, 1984. Application for Direct Appellate Re-
view, supra note 13, at 7-8.
40. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
41. Id
42. Id
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IV. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS' RULING
The policy issued to BSO obligated Commercial Union to defend
any action brought against BSO that sought damages for personal inju-
ries that were covered by the policy.43 The policy issued to BSO pro-
vided coverage for personal injuries:
arising out of one or more of the following offenses committed
in the conduct of the named insured's business:
B. The publication or utterance of a libel or slander or
other defamatory of [sic] disparaging material, or a publication
of [sic] utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy,
except publications or utterances in the course of or related to
advertising, broadcasting or telecasting activities conducted by
or on behalf of the named insured."
The superior court granted summary judgment, finding that Com-
mercial Union was on notice that Ms. Redgrave felt that the public can-
cellation coupled with the press release constituted more than a contract
claim.45 The court found that Ms. Redgrave's claim maintained that
"the BSO's actions sent a false message that she was the one at fault for
the cancellation and that she was risky and unemployable, and thus her
professional career had been harmed."46
The court looked to the rule stated in Sterilite Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co. 47 in determining whether Commercial Union had a duty to
defend.48 The appellate court in Sterilite described the process of deter-
mining if there is a duty to defend as "one of envisaging what kinds of
losses may be proved as lying within the range of the allegations of the
complaint, and then seeing whether any such loss fits the expectation of
protective insurance reasonably generated by the terms of the policy."49
The superior court found that the consequential contract damages
sought by Ms. Redgrave appeared to be similar to tort damages in that
she claimed "damage to her professional reputation because she alleged
43. Id.
44. Application for Direct Appellate Review, supra note 13, at 8-9. The word "of" ap-
pearing before "disparaging" and after "publication" is apparently an inadvertent error and
the word "or" was intended. Id. at note 6.
45. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823 at 3 (Mass.
July 15, 1988).
46. Id.
47. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 318, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983).
48. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823, slip op. at 4
(Mass. July 15, 1988).
49. Sterilite, 17 Mass. App. Ct. at 318.
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that others would not hire her after BSO's actions."5 Therefore, the
court found that issues relating to defamatory and disparaging material
were fairly raised by Ms. Redgrave's complaint,5 and that Commercial
Union should have defended BSO in its suit with Ms. Redgrave.
V. SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF
MASSACHUSETrS' REASONING
After the lower court's grant of summary judgment to BSO on this
count, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted Commercial
Union's request for direct appellate review. 2 In upholding the superior
court's decision, the supreme judicial court found that the essence of Ms.
Redgrave's claim was that BSO's breach of contract "somehow spoke
slightingly about her and damaged her reputation." 3 The court further
found that the terms "other defamatory or disparaging material" were
ambiguous since they were not defined in the policy. 4 Since the lan-
guage of the policy permitted more than one interpretation, the court
held that "other defamatory or disparaging material" should be inter-
preted in a light most favorable to BSO.55
The more inclusive definition of disparagement and, therefore, the
more favorable to BSO, was the Webster's New International Dictionary
of the English Language definition which is "to lower in rank and esti-
mation by actions or words" or "to speak slightingly of."5 6 Since Ms.
Redgrave claimed that the breach of contract "somehow spoke slight-
ingly of her," her claim did allege an injury for which Commercial
Union's policy provided coverage and Commercial Union did have a
duty to defend BSO."
VI. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOLDING
The holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that
Commercial Union did have the duty to defend BSO in the breach of
contract suit is extremely significant to the entertainment industry. Even
though Commercial Union's policy did not specifically provide coverage
for claims brought against BSO for breach of contract, the court never-
50. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823, slip op. at 5
(Mass. July 15, 1988).
51. Id.
52. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
53. Id. at 1159.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 545 N.E.2d at 1157.
57. Id. at 1159.
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theless found that the complaint alleged facts which could reasonably be
interpreted to fall within the coverage as provided by the policy."8 Even
though BSO was unable to point out a case in any jurisdiction where a
court had held that there was a duty to defend a claim for breach of
contract that sought consequential damage for injury to reputation, the
supreme judicial court still found that Commercial Union did have such
a duty. 59
Although there were no Massachusetts cases directly on point, there
were several cases outside of Massachusetts which had interpreted identi-
cal policy language where the cause of action was for breach of contract
that sought consequential damages for injury to reputation.'o Without
exception, these cases held that there was no duty to defend claims for
breach of contract where the plaintiff alleged damage to reputation.61
Unless personal injury contracts are rewritten to specifically exclude
indemnification and defense of claims for breach of contract, the Massa-
chusetts court's decision compels insurers to defend breach of contract
suits where facts exist which remotely could be interpreted as somehow
damaging a reputation. An analysis of this suit in the context of the tests
that courts use to determine whether or not an insurer has the duty to
defend will further illustrate the ramifications of the court's holding.
VII. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
Even though there were no allegations that BSO published any
libelous, slanderous, defamatory, or disparaging material concerning Ms.
Redgrave, both the superior court62 and the supreme judicial court found
58. Id.
59. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 16, at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. Commercial Union cited to the following cases in support of its contention that the
precedent in these cases was that there was no duty to defend in breach of contract cases
seeking damage to reputation: Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Louisiana Industries Pre-
stressed Corp., 259 So. 2d 89, 90-1 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (no duty to defend contract claim even
though complaint alleged that "as a direct and proximate result of the" breach of contract the
claimant suffered "the loss of his reputation .... "); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. First
Security Bank of Bozeman, 662 F. Supp. 1126, 1127, 1132 (D. Mont. 1987) (no duty to defend
breach of employment contract claim even where third party complaint alleged "damage to his
professional reputation" arising from alleged violation of civil rights and breach of contract);
Brooklyn Law School v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 661 F. Supp. 445, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd
849 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1988) (no duty to duty [sic] to defend claims of breach of contract and
tortious interference with contractual relations); and Angelina Cas. v. Pattonville-Bridgeton
Terr., 706 S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (no duty to defend suit alleging "that 'in
terminating the plaintiffs, the defendants have so tarnished plaintiff's employment records that
plaintiffs have been able [sic] to obtain other' equivalent employment"). Id.
62. Application for Direct Appellate Review, supra note 13, at 11.
[Vol. I11
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that Ms. Redgrave's complaint alleged a personal injury against which
Commercial Union had agreed to defend. To determine if this finding is
valid, one must look at how insurance policies are interpreted when there
is a question as to whether the insurer has a duty to defend.
A. Coverage Provided by Liability Insurance Contracts
Liability insurance contracts generally contain two promises.63 The
first promise is that the insurance company will indemnify the insured,
which means that it will pay all covered claims and judgments that are
brought against the insured." The second promise is that the insurance
company agrees to defend the insured in any suit brought against the
insured which alleges and seeks damages for an injury which is covered
by the insurance policy.65 These two promises are interrelated because
the insurance company ("insurer") is promising to indemnify and defend
against only those claims which are within the insurance policy's cover-
age." Although interrelated, the promise to defend is separate from the
promise to indemnify in that the insurer will have to defend the insured
even if the claims brought against the insured later prove to be false or
groundless.67
An insurer does not wish to breach its duty to defend because it may
be held liable for the insured's cost of defending the lawsuit plus reason-
able attorney's fees,68 up to the limits of the policy.69 If the insurer has
the duty to defend, it is to its advantage to take control of the lawsuit at
the earliest date, since an experienced insurance lawyer is more likely to
minimize the effects of any adverse judgments.7° For example, the suit
brought against the BSO by Ms. Redgrave lasted seven years and the
estimated cost of the defense of the suit is as much as one million dol-
lars.7 Therefore, insurance companies want precise rules to enable them
to decide whether or not there is a duty to defend a suit that is brought
against their insured.72
Because an insurance policy is a written contract, the policy must be
63. Garbett, The Duty to Defend in a Liability Insurance Policy: Should the Exclusive
Pleading Test be Replaced?, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 236 (1982).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Garbett, supra note 63, at 236.
68. Id. at 237.
69. 7c JOHN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4689, at
210 (1979).
70. Garbett, supra note 63, at 237.
71. The National Law Journal, November 20, 1989, at 6, col. 2.
72. Garbett, supra note 63, at 237.
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construed by the principles that control other contracts. 3 The duty of
the insurer to provide a defense for claims brought against its insured is
contractual in nature.74 As a result, the court must look at the insurance
policy and determine from its language, if possible, what defense obliga-
tions the insurer has.7 5
A court uses one of two tests to determine if the insurer has a duty
to defend: the exclusive pleading test or the factual test. Either test uses
one or more of the four rules of insurance policy construction: the plain
meaning rule, use of extrinsic evidence rule, the contra-insurer rule, or
the reasonable expectations doctrine.
B. Exclusive Pleading Test
The traditional rule for determining if there is a duty to defend is the
exclusive pleading test.7 6 This test looks at the allegations in the com-
plaint to see if the complaint states facts that would fairly bring the claim
within the policy's coverage. 7 The exclusive pleading test does not allow
the court to consider any facts that are not pleaded in the complaint.78 A
court applying the exclusive pleading test, however, will find a duty to
defend, even if the complaint is "inartfully drafted," as long as the facts
that are pleaded give rise to a claim for which the policy has promised to
indemnify the insured. 79 In addition, the insurance company must de-
fend if the claim as pleaded states a cause of action for which indemnity
has been provided even if there are demonstrable grounds to prove that
the claim is "groundless, false, or fraudulent."80 Hence, the insurer's
duty to defend is triggered solely by the facts alleged in a claim against
the insured. 1
In Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., Commercial Union had prom-
ised to defend any claim brought against the BSO for damages arising
out of the "publication or utterance of a libel or slander or other defama-
tory [or] disparaging material."8 2 Under the exclusive pleading test,
therefore, if Ms. Redgrave's complaint against BSO stated facts that al-
73. B. OSTRAGER & T. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES
§ 1.01, at 3 (2d ed. 1989).
74. Id. at § 5.01, at 105.
75. Id.
76. Garbett, supra note 63, at 238.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ostrager & Newman, The Insurer's Duty to Defend, in 343 INSURANCE, EXCESS, AND
REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 24 (1988).
80. Id. at 25.
81. Garbett, supra note 63, at 240.
82. 545 N.E.2d at 1158-59.
[Vol. I11
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leged damages for "the publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of
other defamatory or disparaging material," Commercial Union was re-
quired to defend BSO in the suit.
C. The Factual Test
With the advent of notice pleading in federal and state courts, where
the complaint merely serves as notice without truly informing the de-
fendant of the nature or extent of the plaintiff's claims, courts began to
deviate from the exclusive pleading test.83 The new test is called the fac-
tual test.84 Under this test the courts look "beyond the complaint to the
actual facts in determining whether an insurer is obligated to defend."'
This test is often applied when the allegations in the complaint are inade-
quate to determine if there is a duty to defend.86 In such a case the court
can look beyond the allegations in the complaint to look at the objective
facts to determine if there is a duty to defend.87
Massachusetts, and other jurisdictions following the factual test,
would be the only jurisdictions which would find a duty to defend in this
case. Since Massachusetts case law holds that "the duty to defend is
based on facts alleged in the complaint and those facts which are known
by the insurer,"88 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used the
factual test to determine that Commercial Union had the duty to defend
BSO in this breach of contract claim. In Boston Symphony Orchestra,
Inc., the supreme judicial court looked beyond the complaint to evidence
that Commercial Union knew Ms. Redgrave was seeking damages for
injury to her reputation.89
D. Rules of Construction
The Massachusetts court determined that there was an injury al-
leged which fell within the zone of coverage."° For a court to determine
that the damages are within the coverage of an insurance policy, it must
examine the insurance contract and apply the rules of construction that
are applicable to an insurance contract. The facts outside the complaint,
indicating that Ms. Redgrave was actually seeking damages for injury to
83. Garbett, supra note 63, at 259.
84. Id
85. Id at 249.
86. Id at 251 (footnote omitted).
87. Id
88. 545 N.E.2d at 1158 (quoting Desrosiers v. Royal Ins. Co. 393 Mass. 37, 40, 468
N.E.2d 625 (1984)).
89. 545 N.E.2d at 1158.
90. Id. at 1159.
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her reputation, only become significant if these facts state a claim that is
within the coverage of the policy issued to the BSO.
1. The Plain Meaning Rule of Construction
The general rule for determining if an allegation falls within the
zone of coverage is that "the language of an insurance policy will be
given its plain meaning and there will be no resort to rules of construc-
tion unless an ambiguity exists."91 Insurance contracts are to be con-
strued in the same way that other contracts are construed and must be
interpreted to reflect the intention of the parties to the contract at the
time the contract was made.92 The first step for a court that is interpret-
ing an insurance contract is to give to the language of the contract its
plain meaning.93
The superior court found that Commercial Union's policy did not
limit the definition of defamatory material to libel and slander because
the policy recognized other "defamatory or disparaging material."94
Further, since the policy did not define the term "disparaging material"95
the court found the language to be ambiguous, and looked to extrinsic
evidence to determine the intent of the parties.96
2. The Extrinsic Evidence Rule
If there is an ambiguity in the insurance policy, the court must con-
sider extrinsic evidence to determine the actual intent of the parties.97
Extrinsic evidence is often submitted to explain the meaning of the pol-
icy, or to show that the interpretation offered by the insurer is either not
the only reasonable interpretation of the policy language or that the in-
surer's interpretation is inconsistent with the insurer's internal
documents.
98
Confusion exists over the type of extrinsic evidence which is admis-
sible.99 Some courts have held that only evidence relating to the mutual
91. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 73, at § 1.01[a], at 3.
92. Id. at § 1.03, at 9.
93. Id. § 1.01[a], at 3.
94. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823, slip op. at 5
(Mass. July 15, 1988).
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 5.
97. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 73, at § 1.01[b], at 5.
98. Caton, Russell, & Levin, The Rules of Insurance Policy Construction and the Myth of
the "Sophisticated Insured", in 385 INSURANCE, ExCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DIs-
PUTES 62-63 (B. Ostrager & T. Newman ed. 1990).
99. Id. at 64.
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intent of the parties is admissible."°° Internal documents and communi-
cations which are evidence of undisclosed unilateral intent have also been
admitted against an insured. 1 However, a party cannot offer against
another party evidence of its own undisclosed intent because this evi-
dence is nothing more than self-serving hearsay.' 2 If extrinsic evidence
of custom or usage exists which gives a particular meaning to a word or
phrase, it is admitted if the policy language is ambiguous. 103 If the court
determines that there is a particular meaning according to custom or
usage, that meaning will prevail unless the parties have expressly ex-
cluded it." Custom or usage, however, is not established by a showing
that an expert in the field would have understood the policy terms.0 5
Commercial Union contended that "disparaging material" refers to
the torts of product disparagement and disparagement of property.' °6
BSO pointed out that the policy did not use the term "disparagement,"
and therefore, the policy did not refer to disparagement torts.'0 7 Rather
the policy used the term "disparaging material" which is susceptible to a
broader meaning which is to "demean or to lower the reputation of."' '
Although the evidence submitted by BSO did not relate to the mu-
tual intent of the parties, the evidence did show that the interpretation
offered by Commercial Union was not the only reasonable interpretation.
Commercial Union's interpretation did, however, show evidence of cus-
tom or usage of the term "disparaging material" by the insurance indus-
try. o The superior court held that because this language was contained
in a form contract, Commercial Union could not rely on the narrowest
meaning found in the custom or usage of insurance companies." 0 Be-
cause the superior court did not accept Commercial Union's interpreta-
tion, it must have decided that only an expert in the insurance field
would have defined "disparaging material" as disparagement of property
100. Id.
101. Id. at 65.
102. Canton, Russell, & Levin, supra note 98, at 66.
103. Ostrager & Newman, Rules of Construction Applied in Insurance Coverage Disputes in
343 INSURANCE, ExcESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 565 (1988).
104. Id
105. Id
106. 545 N.E.2d at 1159. The tort of disparagement protects injuries produced by a com-
munication that damages the quality of what a person has to sell or the character of a person's
business. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 964 (1984).
107. Brief for Appellee at 42, Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins.,
Co., 545 N.E.2d 1156 (Mass. 1989) (No. 5038).
108. Id. at 43.
109. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 45-49.
110. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823, slip op. at 6
(Mass. July 15, 1988).
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or product disparagement. Because the examination of the extrinsic evi-
dence failed to determine the intent of the parties, the superior court then
turned to the rules of construction applicable to an insurance contract in
order to resolve the ambiguity of this language."'1
3. Contra-Insurer Rule of Construction
If the court is unable to determine the actual intent of the parties by
examining the extrinsic evidence, the court must use as a last resort other
rules of construction to resolve the ambiguity."12 Many courts apply the
contra-insurer rule, which provides that ambiguous insurance contracts
must be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.' '3 The
insured need only supply the court with a reasonable interpretation." 4
The rationale for this rule is that the insurance company drafted the pol-
icy and primarily had its own interest in mind. "I Therefore, if the policy
language is ambiguous, the insured, who had no part in drafting the lan-
guage, is entitled to the more favorable interpretation."
16
The court, however, cannot automatically construe the language
against the insurer." 7 The court must first consider the sophistication of
the parties and their abilities to bargain."'
Both the superior court" 9 and the supreme court found that Massa-
chusetts case law uses the contra-insurer rule to resolve ambiguities in
insurance policy language. 120 Because BSO's definition of disparaging
material, "to speak slightingly of," was more favorable to BSO, the
supreme judicial court held that this was the interpretation that should
be given this policy term.' 2 ' Given this broad definition, Ms. Redgrave's
complaint did allege facts that stated a cause of action for which Com-
mercial Union had agreed to defend BSO. 22
4. Reasonable Expectations Doctrine
A variation of the contra-insurer rule has been adopted by many
111. See 545 N.E.2d at 1159.
112. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 73, § 1.01[c], at 6.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at § 1.03[b][1], at 11.
115. IA at 12.
116. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 73, § 1.03[b][l], at 12.
117. Id. at § 1.01[c], at 7.
118. Id.
119. Boston Symphony Orchestra v. Commercial Union Ins., Co., No. 71823, slip op. at 6
(Mass. July 15, 1988).
120. 545 N.E.2d at 1159.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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courts. 123 This variation, known as the reasonable expectations doctrine,
honors the insured's expectation as to the nature and terms of the insur-
ance coverage, 124 even if a careful review of the policy language reveals a
particular limitation or exclusion. 125 The test for the meaning of a term
under the reasonable expectations doctrine is not what the drafter in-
tended, but rather what a reasonable person in the insured's position
would have understood it to mean. 126 If the reasonable expectations doc-
trine had been applied in this case, the court would have had to deter-
mine what reasonable expectations BSO had when it received the policy.
In order for the policy to be interpreted in its favor, BSO would have
needed to have reasonably believed that the policy language of "other
disparaging material" provided coverage for any publication or utter-
ances that spoke slightingly of another person.
VIII. EFFECTS ON THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
Commercial Union speculated that the Massachusetts court's inter-
pretation would "require personal injury insurers to defend contract ac-
tions anytime an insured is found to be in breach of a contract with a
famous person."'127 The Massachusetts court disagreed, pointing out
that Commercial Union could change the language of its policy to only
defend against libel, slander or product disparagement if that was what it
intended to cover.12' The effects of this decision may cause insurance
companies which issue policies to employers of well-known personalities
to reword their policies to insure that there is no coverage for any dam-
ages that would flow from a breach of contract suit.
Never before has a court decided that an insurance company must
defend a suit for breach of contract when the complaint has alleged dam-
age to reputation.129 The true ramifications of this holding to employers
of well-known personalities are unknown. One result could be the one
suggested by the supreme judicial court-that insurance companies may
123. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 73, § 1.03[b][2][B], at 16. The courts in the fol-
lowing 30 states have recognized some variation of the reasonable expectations doctrine: Ala-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id. at 16-20.
124. Id. at § 1.03[b][2], at 14.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1.03[b][2][A], at 15.
127. 545 N.E.2d at 1159.
128. Id.
129. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 16, at 5.
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rewrite their policies to specifically exclude coverage of these actions. 3 °
If insurance companies do respond to this suit by changing their policies
to exclude coverage for other disparaging material and to specifically ex-
clude breach of contract actions, many employers will find themselves
unable to acquire needed liability insurance coverage. If this change in
insurance coverage does occur, employers may decide not to hire people
who have a past history of breach of contract suits or who are controver-
sial personalities."' Employers will not want to risk the chance of ex-
posing themselves to possible suits if there is a chance that they will not
be covered by their liability insurance policy.
A reaction of this kind would have a chilling effect on the entertain-
ment industry, in that employers will severely limit their involvement
with controversial projects and personalities. This would not only harm
the entertainment industry itself, but would also harm the public in that
the opportunity to view controversial works and performers will be lost.
Political satire has traditionally been a mechanism for social change, and
if the public never sees these works, society as a whole will be injured.
Another result will be an increase in the cost of personal injury poli-
cies. The amount of the premium paid in exchange for receiving insur-
ance coverage is determined by the dollar amount of losses that are
expected or anticipated by the insurance company. 132 Personal liability
insurance policies only cover losses for particular actions that are listed
in the policy. 133 The holding in Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.,1
31
which extends coverage beyond what Commercial Union had antici-
pated, will most likely have the effect of increasing insurance premiums
to cover the potential cost of defending breach of contract actions.
This suit will affect employers of any employee whose livelihood de-
pends on his or her reputation and image as perceived by potential em-
ployers and the general public. Athletes, coaches, managers, actors and
actresses who make their living not only by their current contract, but
also by their ability to sell their image for commercials, product endorse-
ments, and public appearances will be affected by this holding. Because
130. 545 N.E.2d at 1159.
131. In discussing the possibility of hiring Raquel Welch for the movie "Cannery Row," the
producers questioned Ms. Welch about rumors of problems between her and her previous
directors. Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 207 Cal. App. 3d 164, 254 Cal. Rptr.
645, 648. (Review granted March 2, 1989, and cause transferred Nov. 22, 1989, to Cal. App.
2d Dist. with directions to vacate opinion and reconsider in light of Newman v. Emerson
Radio, 48 Cal. 3d 973 (1989)).
132. Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 40.
133. Id.
134. 545 N.E.2d 1156.
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of the large amount of money that is at stake when a public person's
reputation has been damaged, breach of contract suits will be litigated. 3
Therefore, insurance companies will either have to raise their premiums
or specifically exclude the potentiality for defending causes of action re-
sulting from breach of contract. Because of the broad reaching effects of
this holding, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts may very well
have extended the duty to defend too far.
Sarah Ambrose Eddy*
135. Timothy Hutton sued MGM for fraud and breach of contract when MGM cancelled
plans to make the movie "Roadshow." The jury awarded him $9.75 million. Raquel Welch
sued MGM for breach of contract in 1989 for firing her from the movie "Cannery Row." She
was awarded $10.8 million. Neumeyer, Sue Crazy!, 34 Los ANGELES MAGAZINE 100 (1989).
* The author wishes to thank Martha Early, Lisa Garner, and Dean Frederick Lower
for their valuable comments; Richard L. Neumeier for his assistance in the research for this
note; and Harold Eddy for his advice, support and patience.
1991]

